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The Implications of Shelby County v. Holder: How the Supreme Court Undid Fifty Years 





In 2006, for the fourth time since its passage, Congress reauthorized the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 for an additional twenty-five years. 1  In an era marked by 
Congressional gridlock, the vote was unusually lopsided; the reauthorization passed the 
Republican-controlled House of Representatives 2  by a vote of 390-33 and the 
Republican-controlled Senate3 by a vote of 98-04  before being signed into law by a 
Republican President.5  In reauthorizing the Act, Congress explained: 
    
 [V]estiges of discrimination in voting continue to exist as demonstrated 
by second generation barriers constructed to prevent minority 
voters from fully participating in the electoral process. . . . The 
continued evidence of racially polarized voting in each of the 
jurisdictions covered by the expiring provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 demonstrates that racial and language 
minorities remain politically vulnerable, warranting the continued 
protection of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.6  
 
Congress reauthorized the Act with little controversy.  In any constitutional 
democracy, one of the overriding jobs of national legislators is to protect everyone’s right 
to vote, as it makes up the backbone of our representative government.  In the most basic 
sense, protecting each citizen’s right to vote means ensuring that all citizens, regardless 
                                                        
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Seton Hall School of Law. I’d like to thank my comment advisor, Kelly Anderson, 
and my faculty advisor, professor Mark Alexander, for their invaluable help during the Comment writing 
process. 
1 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2620–2621 (2013).  
2 Congress Profiles, HISTORY, ART, AND ARCHIVES: THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
(Nov. 22, 2013, 11:12 PM), http://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/109th/. 
3 Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, ART AND HISTORY: THE UNITED STATES SENATE (Nov. 22, 
2013, 11:12 PM), http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm. 
4 Bush Signs Voting Rights Act Extension, NBC NEWS (July 27, 2006), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/14059113/#.UjRlTBbvwUs. 
5 Id.  
6 Fannie Lou Hammer, Rosa Parks, & Coretta Scott King, Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and 
Amendments Act of 2006, 109 P.L. 246 (2013) [hereinafter Voting Rights Act Reauthorization]. 
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of their skin color, are given the right to cast a ballot.  Protection of the right to vote also 
means, however, that every vote is given equal weight and no policies are put in place 
that may dilute the strength of the votes cast by minorities.  Nearly 94% of Congressmen 
held this belief in 2006.7  The overwhelming support for voting equality suggested that 
while our partisan politics may have caused disagreements on many issues, the sacred 
right to vote was kept out of the game of political brinksmanship. 
 The social progress made since the Voting Rights Act’s passage and subsequent 
reauthorizations came to a screeching halt in June of 2013 when the Supreme Court 
handed down its opinion in Shelby County v. Holder. 8  In that decision, five unelected 
members of the United States Supreme Court disregarded the express will of 488 of the 
people’s representatives and struck a major blow against America’s seminal piece of civil 
rights legislation.  
 This Comment begins with a brief overview of the Voting Rights Act in Section 
II.  Section III analyzes the Shelby County decision itself.  Justice Roberts’s majority 
opinion contains six major reasons that justify the Chief Justice’s holding; this Comment 
will examine each reason in depth.  Section III also offers a detailed exploration of 
Justice Ginsburg’s rebuttals to each of the majority’s key arguments.  Section IV contains 
a brief discussion of Justice Thomas’s concurrence. 
Section V argues that the federal government still plays a role in regulating state-
level elections, a concept dismissed by the majority. This section examines past decisions 
dealing with federal regulatory involvement in state elections, both generally and 
specifically relating to the Voting Rights Act.   
                                                        
7 Bush Signs Voting Rights Act Extension, NBC NEWS (July 27, 2006), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/14059113/#.UjRlTBbvwUs. 
8 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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Section VI attempts to rebut Justice Roberts’s argument that the Voting Rights 
Act is no longer necessary because minorities presently have equal access to the polls and 
stated-based discriminatory voting policies are a thing of the past. As such, Justice 
Roberts argues that the express will of Congress should be ignored. To rebut, this Section 
explores the idea of second-generation barriers as a modern-day obstacle to voting for 
minority citizens. 
In Section VII, this Comment argues that Congress must pass a new and improved 
Voting Rights Act for the twenty-first century.  As the Shelby County opinion makes 
clear, Congress is free to fill the void created by the decision by updating Section Four to 
reflect present-day circumstances.  Congress should seize this opportunity to strengthen 
the 1965 Act by adding provisions explicitly prohibiting vote dilution and other recently-
created, second-generation barriers.  
II. Brief Overview of the Voting Rights Act 
In order to understand the significance of the Shelby County decision, one must 
first understand the Voting Rights Act itself and its major provisions.  The Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 is made up of several sections, three of which are significant for the purposes 
of this Comment.  The first section to consider is Section Two of the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, codified at 42 U.S.C 1973.  It states: 
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or 
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote 
on account of race or color[.] . . . A violation . . . is established if, 
based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political 
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a 
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) [minority voters] in 
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the 
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electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.9 
 
The Court did not touch this provision; instead, the Court said Section Two is 
“permanent, applies nationwide, and is not at issue in this case.”10  As will be shown 
later, however, Section Two is only a limited remedy for minorities who have had their 
vote either taken away or diminished by state policies and does not, by itself, give rise to 
the institutional progress created by the original Voting Rights Act.  
The other two sections of the Act that are important for our purposes are Sections 
Four and Five.  Section Four established a pre-clearance formula that identified states 
who had taken away and/or diluted minority voting rights.11  At the time of original 
passage of the Voting Rights Act, Section Four states included those states that had 
“maintained a test or device as a prerequisite to voting as of November 1, 1964, and had 
less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout in the 1964 Presidential election.”12  The 
states identified under this formula in 1965 were Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia.13   
Section Four’s formula identified states that were subject to the Voting Rights Act 
provisions.  Section Five mandated that those Section Four states needed to seek federal 
approval for any proposed change in their state-based voting procedures. 14   In its 
decision, the Court found Section Four unconstitutional as an-out-of date formula that no 
longer applied to present day circumstances.15  Because Section Five only applies to 
                                                        
9 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (West 2013). 
10 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013). 
11 Id. at 2618.  
12 Id. at 2619. 
13 Id. at 2620. 
14 Id. at 2618. 
15 Id. at 2627 (citing Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009)) (“By 
2009, however, we concluded that the ‘coverage formula raise[d] serious constitutional questions.’ . . . As 
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states identified under Section Four’s formula, the ruling also indirectly neutralized 
Section Five.  
III. Shelby County v. Holder 
The issue in Shelby County was whether Section Four of the Voting Rights Act 
was unconstitutional.16  The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that it was.17  Although it only 
invalidated one Section, the decision spells the death knell of the Voting Rights Act 
without Congressional intervention. 
The majority opinion is both misguided and an improper application of pertinent 
law.  This section analyzes six justifications that the majority gives for its holding, and 
then discusses why each one of them is flawed.   
First, Chief Justice Robert’s assertion that the Voting Rights Act is no longer a 
necessary burden on states’ rights due to the parity in racial voting is an overly simplistic 
analysis of the data that refuses to take into account the effect the Voting Rights Act has 
on those numbers.18   
Second, the majority’s reasoning that the law was meant to be temporary and 
nearly fifty years of its existence is far more than what was originally intended is met 
with an analysis of the “rational basis test,” the standard the court must use to invalidate a 
law of this nature.19  Because Congress’s 2006 reauthorization expressly recognized a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
we explained, a statute’s ‘current burdens’ must be justified by ‘current needs,’ and any ‘disparate 
geographic coverage’ must be ‘sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.’ . . . The coverage formula 
met that test in 1965, but no longer does so.”). 
16 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
17 Id. 
18 Shelby Cnty., infra notes 33–34. 
19 Shelby Cnty., infra note 46. 
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continued need for the law,20 the Court demonstrated improper activism in reaching this 
holding.   
Third, the Chief Justice asserts that southern states today will not discriminate 
against their minority citizens through their voting laws should the Voting Rights Act 
fall.21  A quick look at Department of Justice statistics, however, shows this is not the 
case.22 
Fourth, the majority’s reasoning that equal sovereignty demands the law be held 
unconstitutional is an improper application of that doctrine.23 
Fifth, Chief Justice Roberts similarly asserts a Tenth Amendment argument to 
support his conclusion that the Voting Rights Act is an improper intrusion on states’ 
rights.24  While not discussed in this section because Justice Ginsburg did not directly 
address it, the rebuttal to the Chief Justice’s argument occurs in Section IV-D, infra, 
where it is demonstrated that the Chief Justice’s interpretation of Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence is unsound. 
Finally, the majority takes note in their opinion that it left Section Two of the 
Voting Rights Act intact as a remedy for individuals who feel that their state voting laws 
unfairly discriminate against them.25  While Section Two does remain intact, it is an 
insufficient remedy to combat statewide institutional discrimination.26 
A. The Voting Rights Act and the State of Voting Today  
                                                        
20 Voting Rights Act Reauthorization, supra note 6. 
21 Shelby Cnty., infra note 55. 
22 Shelby Cnty., infra note 58. 
23 Katzenbach, infra note 66. 
24 Ashcroft, infra note 72. 
25 Shelby Cnty., infra note 76. 
26 Shelby Cnty., infra note 77. 
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The majority invalidated Section Four of the Voting Rights Act on the grounds 
that the formula is: (1) out of date; (2) reflective of circumstances as they existed in 1965, 
rather than 2013, and (3) no longer necessary.27  The majority supports this finding by 
looking at voter turnout numbers in the six states originally covered by Section Four 
when the act was passed in 1965.28  The Court examines the percentage of registered 
white and black voters in 1965 and compares that to the percentage of white and black 
voters registered in 2004, two years before the Voting Rights Act reauthorization.29  The 
numbers, as laid out in the opinion are found below30: 
  1965 2004 
  White Black Gap White Black Gap 
Alabama 69.2 19.3 49.9 73.8 72.9 0.9 
Georgia 62.[6] 27.4 35.2 63.5 64.2 -0.7 
Louisiana 80.5 31.6 48.9 75.1 71.1 4.0 
Mississippi 69.9 6.7 63.2 72.3 76.1 -3.8 
South 
Carolina 
75.7 37.3 38.4 74.4 71.1 3.3 
Virginia 61.1 38.3 22.8 68.2 57.4 10.8 
 
A surface look at these numbers seemingly supports the majority’s conclusion that the 
Voting Rights Act, a law put in place to ensure equal access to the polls regardless of 
race, has accomplished its goal and, thus, is no longer necessary.  Justice Roberts has 
long believed in the present day uselessness of the Voting Rights Act.  In his 2009 
decision in Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, a case that 
seriously called into question the continued constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, 
Justice Roberts noted: “Things have changed in the South.  Voter turnout and registration 
                                                        
27 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2612 (“There is no denying, however, that the conditions that originally 
justified these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.”). 
28 Shelby Cnty., infra note 30. 
29 Shelby Cnty., infra note 31. 
30 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626 (citing S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 11 (2006) and H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 
12 (2006)). 
  8 
rates now approach parity.  Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare.  
And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.”31   
While agreeing that things have improved, Justice Ginsburg draws in her dissent a 
drastically different conclusion from these numbers.  Justice Ginsburg views the closing 
of the racial gap in voter registration as proof that the Voting Rights Act is working 
exactly the way in which it was intended.32  Underpinning this view, Justice Ginsburg 
points out that since the Act’s inception, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has blocked 
over 1,000 proposed state-wide changes to voting procedures in Section Four covered 
jurisdictions.33  In fact, the DOJ had blocked more proposed changes as discriminatory 
between 1982 and 2004 (626) than it did between 1965 and 1982 (490).34  Rather than 
demonstrating the present-day uselessness of the Voting Rights Act, Justice Ginsburg 
believes these numbers show that if covered jurisdictions no longer need to seek federal 
approval to change their voting procedures, those objectionable changes once blocked by 
the DOJ will go into effect, thus increasing the racial gap in voter registration numbers to 
pre-1965 levels.35 
                                                        
31 Id. at 2618 (citing Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. 193). 
32Id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“True, conditions in the South have impressively improved since 
passage of the Voting Rights Act. Congress noted this improvement and found that the VRA was the 
driving force behind it.”). 
33 Id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)  (citing 1 Voting Rights Act: Evidence of Continued Need, Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d 
Sess., p. 172 (2006)). 
34 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2639. 
35 Id. at 2640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The number of discriminatory changes blocked or deterred by the 
pre-clearance requirement suggests that the state of voting rights in covered jurisdictions would have been 
significantly absent this remedy.”). 
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In the preamble to its 2006 reauthorization, Congress similarly demonstrated its 
belief in a continued need for the Voting Rights Act.36  In its reauthorization, Congress 
described the purpose of the Act as follows: 
The record compiled by Congress demonstrates that, without the 
continuation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 protections, racial 
and language minority citizens will be deprived of the opportunity 
to exercise their right to vote, or will have their votes diluted, 
undermining the significant gains made by minorities in the last 40 
years.37 
 
Justice Ginsburg found it of vital importance that Congress, by overwhelmingly 
reauthorizing the Act in 2006, explicitly found that the Act remains necessary to protect 
minority voting interests.  Justice Ginsburg believed the Court cannot summarily dismiss 
such overwhelming legislative support for the continued existence of the Act.38  Citing 
precedent, Justice Ginsburg noted: “The Court’s role, then, is not to substitute its 
judgment for that of Congress, but to determine whether the legislative record sufficed to 
show that ‘Congress could rationally have determined that [its chosen] provisions were 
appropriate methods.’”39   
Justice Ginsburg believed that juridical precedent dictates that as long as 
Congress’s law is rationally related to a legitimate end—in this case, enforcing the 
Fifteenth Amendment right to vote, regardless of race—the Court should not overturn 
enacted legislation.40  Because the “rationally related” standard is extremely deferential to 
Congress, Justice Ginsburg’s argued that Congress’s finding of the continued need for a 
                                                        
36 Voting Rights Act Reauthorization, supra note 6. 
37 Id. at § 2(b)(9). 
38 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“When confronting the most constitutionally 
invidious form of discrimination, and the most fundamental right in our democratic system, Congress’ 
power to act is at its height.”). 
39 Id. at 2638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176–177 
(1980)). 
40 Id. 
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Voting Rights Act, despite significant improvements in minority voter turnout numbers, 
should not be disturbed by the Court because the pre-clearance requirements are indeed 
rationally related to the enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment.   
The critically important decision to change voting procedures in a self-governing 
society is one that should not be made by nine unelected, unaccountable judges.  Rather, 
elected officials are more competent to make such an important decision because they are 
answerable directly to the people and have seen first hand the positive role the Voting 
Rights Act has had in ensuring the bedrock principle of a democratic society—one 
person, one vote—remains true in our time.  The people, through their representatives, 
have clearly spoken and have found a continued need for the Act.41  The Court’s role, 
then, is to show deference.        
B. The Idea that the Law was Always Meant to be Temporary  
  After discussing that the pre-clearance requirement was no longer necessary given 
the state of voting today, the majority transitioned to another reason for their holding—
that the drafters of the law meant it to be a temporary fix to combat the extraordinary 
problem of institutionalized racism in state voting procedures.  
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the first time the court upheld the statute, the 
Court pointed to the extraordinary measures employed by the legislation: “This [Act] 
may have been an uncommon exercise of congressional power, as South Carolina 
contends, but the Court has recognized that exceptional conditions can justify legislative 
measures not otherwise appropriate.”42  Though the Court found the law to be necessary 
in 1966, it did not envision it as a permanent fixture in our society.  
                                                        
41 Voting Right Act Reauthorization, supra note 6. 
42 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966). 
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The Court further noted the temporary nature of the law in Northwest Austin, 
where it claimed: 
As enacted, §§ 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act were temporary 
provisions. They were expected to be in effect for only five years. 
We upheld the temporary Voting Rights Act of 1965 as an 
appropriate exercise of congressional power in Katzenbach, 
explaining that “[t]he constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 must be judged with reference to the historical 
experience which it reflects.”43 We concluded that the problems 
Congress faced when it passed the Act were so dire that 
“exceptional conditions [could] justify legislative measures not 
otherwise appropriate.”44  
 
Combining these key points, the majority suggests that the Act was a temporary solution 
for problems that no longer exist today.45 
 Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, argued that it is irrelevant to the law’s 
constitutionality whether the Framers of the Act felt it should be a temporary fix to an 
extraordinary problem; the key is whether Congress, in its 2006 reauthorization, still had 
a rational basis for renewing the law.46  The rational basis test says that as long as the 
government has a legitimate public interest in mind that is rationally related to its 
disparate treatment of states, the Court will uphold the law at issue.47  Justice Ginsburg 
wrote that the Court has not been faithful to this test in striking the law, especially given 
the evidence that states currently covered under the pre-clearance requirement have 
                                                        
43 Id. at 308. 
44 Id. at 822. 
45 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618 (“There is no denying, however, that the conditions that originally 
justified these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.”). 
46 Id. at 2637–38 (“Until today, in considering the constitutionality of the VRA, the Court has accorded 
Congress the full measure of respect its judgments in this domain should garner. Katzenbach supplies the 
standard of review: “As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to 
effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324). 
47 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“It is enough that there is an 
evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational 
way to correct it.”). 
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attempted continuously to institute discriminatory practices in voting procedures. 48  
Evidence of these discriminatory practices will be discussed later in the Comment.49  For 
a law enacted by Congress to withstand judicial scrutiny under a rational basis standard, 
the Framers of the Act’s intent regarding the law’s the time frame is irrelevant.  Rather, 
all that is necessary is for the Court to determine that the means chosen by Congress 
somehow rationally relate to a legitimate end—in this case, ensuring that all citizens, 
regardless of their skin color, have an equal vote in the democratic process.50  
C. The Pre-Clearance Formula and Present Day Circumstances 
Justice Roberts, and the rest of the majority, believed that the pre-clearance 
formula was outdated and unfairly targeted states that, while they may have instituted 
discriminatory procedures nearly fifty years ago, no longer had such policies, and thus 
should not be burdened by federal regulations whenever they want to change their local 
voting procedures.51  Justice Roberts pointed to the election of minority candidates in 
unprecedented numbers, the complete prohibition on voting tests throughout the country, 
and the lack of disparity in racial voter registration numbers in covered jurisdictions as 
                                                        
48 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2650 (“The Court has time and again declined to upset legislation of this genre 
unless there was no or almost no evidence of unconstitutional action by States.). See, e.g., City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (legislative record “mention[ed] no episodes [of the kind the legislation 
aimed to check] occurring in the past 40 years”). (“No such claim can be made about the congressional 
record for the 2006 VRA reauthorization. Given a record replete with examples of denial or abridgment of 
a paramount federal right, the Court should have left the matter where it belongs: in Congress’ bailiwick.”) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
49 See infra Part VI-C. 
50 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2638. (“So when Congress acts to enforce the right to vote free from racial 
discrimination, we ask not whether Congress has chosen the means most wise, but whether Congress has 
rationally selected means appropriate to a legitimate end”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
51 Id. at 2638–39 (“By the time the Act was reauthorized in 2006 . . . voting tests were abolished, disparities 
in voter registration and turn-out were erased, and African Americans attained political office in record 
numbers. And yet the coverage formula that Congress reauthorized in 2006 ignores these developments, 
keeping the focus on decades-old data relevant to decades-old problems, rather than current data reflecting 
current needs.”). 
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the foundation for his belief that southern states no longer discriminate as they once did.52  
Because Justice Roberts believed that, “[a] statute’s current burdens must be justified by 
current needs,”53 and that “[c]overage today is based on decades old data and eradicated 
practices,”54 Justice Roberts felt justified in striking the law as containing an out-of-date 
pre-clearance formula unreflective of present day circumstances.55 
Justice Ginsburg, on the other hand, fundamentally disagreed with the majority 
that the practices southern states once employed have been eradicated. 56   Citing 
successful Section Two litigation in the country—litigation under the Voting Rights Act 
that allows individuals and the federal government to bring suit against a state’s voting 
procedures as discriminatory after they are implemented57—Justice Ginsburg noted: 
Although covered jurisdictions account for less than 25 percent of 
the country’s population, the Katz study revealed that they 
accounted for 56 percent of successful § 2 litigation since 1982. . . 
.  Controlling for population, there were nearly four times as many 
successful § 2 cases in covered jurisdictions as there were in 
noncovered jurisdictions. . . .  The Katz study further found that § 
2 lawsuits are more likely to succeed when they are filed in 
covered jurisdictions than in noncovered jurisdictions. . . .  From 
these findings—ignored by the Court—Congress reasonably 
concluded that the coverage formula continues to identify the 
jurisdictions of greatest concern.58 
 
                                                        
52 Id. 
53 Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
54 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627. 
55 Id. at 2638–39 (“By the time the Act was reauthorized in 2006 . . . voting tests were abolished, disparities 
in voter registration and turn-out were erased, and African Americans attained political office in record 
numbers. And yet the coverage formula that Congress reauthorized in 2006 ignores these developments, 
keeping the focus on decades-old data relevant to decades-old problems, rather than current data reflecting 
current needs.”). 
56 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2643 (2013) (quoting Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 
One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)) (“racial discrimination in voting remains ‘concentrated in the 
jurisdictions singled out for pre-clearance.’”). (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2013). 
58 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2643. 
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Using the same numbers presented to Congress when they overwhelmingly decided to 
reauthorize the Act in 2006,59 Justice Ginsburg rebuked the majority’s theory that the pre-
clearance formula unfairly targeted states presently based on their actions nearly fifty 
years ago, when the law was originally enacted.  
D. Equal Sovereignty Principals 
Justice Roberts also cited equal sovereignty as a key reason for striking the Act.60  
The Court previously held that, “[a] departure from the fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is 
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”61  Because the majority believed the 
government did not make that showing in Shelby County,62 the Court concluded that the 
Act’s violation of equal sovereignty principles creates Constitutional problems.63  Justice 
Roberts justified his view that the principal of equal sovereignty is so important by 
noting: 
While one state waits months or years and expends funds to 
implement a validly enacted law, its neighbor can typically put the 
same law into effect immediately, through the normal legislative 
process. Even if a noncovered jurisdiction is sued [under Section 
Two], there are important differences between those proceedings 
and pre-clearance proceedings; the pre-clearance proceeding not 
only switches the burden of proof to the supplicant jurisdiction, but 
also applies substantive standards quite different from those 
governing the rest of the nation.64 
 
                                                        
59 Voting Rights Act Reauthorization, supra note 6. 
60 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (quoting Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (“Not only do States retain 
sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also a ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the 
States.”)). 
61 Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203. 
62 Shelby Cnty., supra note 27. 
63 See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567, 580 (1911) (Our nation “was and is a Union of States, equal in 
power, dignity, and authority . . . the constitutional equality of the States is essential to the harmonious 
operation on the scheme upon which the Republic was organized.”). 
64 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624. 
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Justice Ginsburg responded by pointing out that the majority in this case has 
perverted the meaning behind equal sovereignty.65  Justice Ginsburg pointed to South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, which plainly stated, “[t]he doctrine of the equality of States . . . 
applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the 
remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.” 66   By applying equal 
sovereignty to voting rights, the Court is “attributing breadth to the equal sovereignty 
principle in flat contradiction of Katzenbach.” 67   As Justice Ginsburg argued, equal 
sovereignty principles should have no bearing on the constitutionality of the Voting 
Rights Act. 
 Additionally, Justice Ginsburg noted several instances in her dissent where the 
federal government treats states differently.68  After listing several long-standing statutes, 
Justice Ginsburg poignantly asks whether these laws are now constitutionally suspect 
under the majority’s unwarranted expansion of the doctrine of equal sovereignty.69 
E. The Tenth Amendment 
Justice Roberts also points to the Tenth Amendment70  as justification for his 
argument that states are the creators of local voting procedures without interference from 
Washington.71  Justice Roberts asserts that states have significant power under the Tenth 
Amendment to determine the voting procedures for local elections. 72  To support this 
                                                        
65 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (“Today’s unprecedented extension of the equal 
sovereignty principle outside its proper domain . . .  is capable of much mischief.”). 
66 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328-329 (1966). 
67 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
68 See id. 
69 Id. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
70 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”). 
71 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623. 
72 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461–462 (1991) (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124–125 
(1970)). 
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proposition, Justice Roberts cites the 1991 decision, Gregory v. Ashcroft, which said: 
“The Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided 
in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections.” 73   Tenth Amendment 
principles, then, further Justice Roberts’s states’ rights argument regarding the regulation 
of local elections. 
Although Justice Ginsburg does not specifically address the Tenth Amendment 
issue in her dissent, this Comment addresses this issue in Section IV-D, infra.  It is worth 
mentioning at this time, however, that Oregon v. Mitchell, the case underpinning Justice 
Roberts’s Tenth Amendment argument, was actually a case that upheld the 
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act’s provision banning literacy tests as a 
prerequisite to voting.74  The quote above referenced the state’s ability, free from federal 
intrusion, to set the age requirement for local elections.75  Because the Voting Rights Act 
makes no mention of age requirements in state-based elections, Justice Roberts’s opinion 
does not support the conclusion that the Tenth Amendment shields the states from 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act. 
F. Section Two as a Remedy 
After exhausting all justifications for striking the law, Justice Roberts reiterates 
that his holding leaves Section Two unchanged.  As such, he argues, the law still prevents 
the states from employing any discriminatory voting practices.76  
                                                        
73 Id. 
74 Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112. 
75 Id. 
76 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619 (“Both the Federal Government and individuals have sued to enforce §2 
. . . and injunctive relief is available in appropriate cases to block voting laws from going into effect . . .  
Section 2 is permanent, applies nationwide, and is not at issue in this case.”). 
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Justice Ginsburg, however, disagrees with the conclusion that the continued 
existence of Section Two will overcome the impact of striking Sections Four and Five of 
the Voting Rights Act.  Looking back to the evidence received by Congress during the 
2006 reauthorization proceedings, Justice Ginsburg noted: 
Litigation under §2 of the VRA [is] an inadequate substitute for 
pre-clearance in the covered jurisdictions. Litigation occurs only 
after the fact, when the illegal voting scheme has already been put 
in place and individuals have been elected pursuant to it, thereby 
gaining the advantages of incumbency. An illegal scheme might be 
in place for several election cycles before a §2 plaintiff can gather 
sufficient evidence to challenge it. And litigation places a heavy 
financial burden on minority voters.77 
 
Because Congress found there was still a need for the Section Four and Five pre-
clearance requirements and because such a finding was rationally related to the legitimate 
end of ensuring equal access to the polls, the Court, in Justice Ginsburg’s view, failed to 
show the proper deference to Congress—as called for by the rational basis review 
standard—when it struck the law.78 
 For the reasons laid out above, Chief Justice Roberts and the majority were wrong 
in diminishing the Voting Right Act to little more than a symbolic reminder of a once 
truly democratic society. 
IV. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence in Shelby County v. Holder 
Although this Comment’s main focus is the interplay between the majority and 
dissent, it is important to note that Justice Thomas singularly concurred in the opinion.  
The majority held that Section Four’s pre-clearance requirement was unconstitutional, as 
                                                        
77 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2640 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
78 Id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“It is well established that Congress’ judgment regarding exercise 
of its power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments warrants substantial deference.”). 
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it currently existed, for the reasons listed above.79  The Court did say, however, that if 
Congress wished to update the pre-clearance formula to reflect current conditions, it 
would not violate Constitutional principles.80  If that were to happen, Section Five’s 
provision that the federal government must approve any changes to covered jurisdictions 
would once again become effective.81   The Court did not actually find Section Five 
unconstitutional;82 it merely took away that section’s meaning by striking Section Four as 
it currently stood.  If there is no pre-clearance formula, there can be no identifiable 
jurisdictions to comply with any Section Five requirements. 
Justice Thomas, on the other hand, argued it was an unconstitutional intrusion on 
states’ rights to force them to submit their voting policies to the federal government for 
approval prior to their enactment because racially-based voting polices aimed at keeping 
minorities from voting no longer exist.83  As such, Justice Thomas would have found 
Section Five unconstitutional and completely shut the door on the Voting Rights Act that 
the majority left slightly ajar by keeping Section Five intact.84  Though Justice Thomas’s 
opinion is a unique position, no justices joined the concurrence and, thus, his opinion will 
likely have little weight in future jurisprudence on this issue. 
V. The Federal Government’s Role in State Elections 
 
A. The Fifteenth Amendment 
                                                        
79 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2627 (citing Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 557 
U.S. 193 (2009)) (“By 2009, however, we concluded that the ‘coverage formula raise[d] serious 
constitutional questions.’ . . . As we explained, a statute’s ‘current burdens’ must be justified by ‘current 
needs,’ and any ‘disparate geographic coverage’ must be ‘sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.’ 
. . . The coverage formula met that test in 1965, but no longer does so.”).. 
80 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631 (“Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions.”). 
81 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2013). 
82 Id. (“We issue no holding on § 5 itself.”). 
83 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2632 (quoting Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. 193 (2009)) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“The extensive pattern of discrimination that led the 
Court to previously uphold §5 as enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment no longer exists.”). 
84 Id. at 2632. 
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One of the majority’s major arguments regarding the Voting Rights Act is that the 
Act is an unwarranted and unconstitutional intrusion on states’ right to regulate their own 
elections. 85   This conclusion, however, does not square with the Constitution—
specifically the Fifteenth Amendment.86  A simple reading of the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
text indicates that the Framers clearly intended to give Congress the power to ensure 
everyone has equal access to the polls.  Justice Ginsburg agrees: “The stated purpose of 
the Civil War Amendments [which includes the Fifteenth Amendment] was to arm 
Congress with the power and authority to protect all persons within the Nation from 
violations of their rights by the States.”87   
Justice Ginsburg’s view of the Fifteenth Amendment is consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent, specifically the landmark case of Guinn v. United States.88  At issue in 
Guinn was a provision in the Oklahoma Constitution that instituted a literacy test as a 
prerequisite to voting.  Voters were exempted from the literacy test, however, if their 
grandfathers had been entitled to vote as of January 1, 1866, which was prior to the 
adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment.89  While this appeared to be a harmless provision, 
in reality only white voters were entitled to vote in 1866; very few, if any, black people 
were able to vote.  Therefore, under this constitutional mandate, white voters were 
exempted from the literacy tests, while a large majority of blacks were not.  The Court 
                                                        
85 Id. at 2623 (“The Federal Government does not, however, have a general right to review and veto state 
enactments before they go into effect.”). 
86 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”); U.S. CONST. amend. X, § 2 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.”). 
87 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2637 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
88 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). 
89 Id. 
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held that this provision violated the Fifteenth Amendment as an unlawful obstacle to 
minority voting rights and struck it down.90   
The majority’s argument that the Voting Rights Act is inconsistent with the 
Constitution, then, seems to ignore the plain text of the Constitution’s Fifteenth 
Amendment.  The text of the Amendment, as well as well-established judicial precedent, 
lead to the conclusion that the federal government does indeed have a large role to play in 
regulating state-based election procedures. 
B. A History of Voting Rights Act Jurisprudence 
An examination of stare decisis as it relates to the Voting Rights Act shows that 
the federal government has, through the Supreme Court, properly involved itself in state-
based elections.91  An analysis of lower court precedent suggests that the majority’s 
reasoning rests on shaky grounds. 
Prior to the Shelby decision, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Voting Rights Act on four different occasions.92  The first instance occurred one year 
after the Act’s original passage in South Carolina v. Kaztenbach.93  Similar to Shelby, 
Kaztenbach involved a state-based challenge to the law, claiming the Act “exceed[ed] the 
powers of Congress and encroach[ed] on an area reserved to the States by the 
Constitution.”94  After reviewing the Act itself and a history of Fifteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Court found, “[a]s against the reserved powers of the States, Congress 
may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial 
                                                        
90 Id. at 362–364. 
91 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612; 
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973), abrogated by Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612; City of Rome 
v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), abrogated by Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612; Lopez v. Monterey 
Cnty., 525 U.S. 266 (1999), abrogated by Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612. 
92 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301; Georgia, 411 U.S. 526; City of Rome, 446 U.S. 156; Lopez, 525 U.S. 266. 
93 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 301. 
94 Id. at 323. 
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discrimination in voting.”95  One year after the Act’s passage, not only did the Court 
firmly hold the law to be within the bounds of the Constitution, but the Court also did so 
while showing much deference to Congress by employing the rational basis standard.96 
Seven years later, in Georgia v. United States, the Court once again ruled that the 
Voting Rights Act was a constitutional exercise of Congressional authority.97  Georgia 
involved a 1972 reapportionment law, which redrew legislative districts for the state’s 
House of Representatives. 98   As per the Voting Rights Act, Georgia, as a covered 
jurisdiction under Section Four,99 submitted its new law to the Attorney General for 
approval.  The Attorney General, however, objected to the plan and refused to pass the 
new law.100  The Attorney General did not object based on an affirmative finding of a 
discriminatory purpose or effect, but rather the Attorney General simply stated that the 
plan “does not satisfactorily remove the features found objectionable in [Georgia’s] prior 
submission [in 1971].”101  Georgia argued, among other things, that Section Five of the 
Voting Rights Act does not reach state reapportionment plans and, as such, the Attorney 
General could not object to the plan.102  Additionally, Georgia argued that without an 
affirmative finding that the proposed state plan contained a discriminatory purpose or 
effect, the Attorney General could not prevent the law from going into effect under 
                                                        
95 Id. (emphasis added). 
96 Id. 
97 Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973). 
98 Id. at 528. 
99 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2621 (citing S. REP. NO. 109–295, at 11 (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 109–478, at 12 
(2006)). 
100 Georgia, 411 U.S. at 534. 
101 Letter from the Assistant Attorney General of the United States to the State of Georgia (Mar. 24, 1972) 
cited in Georgia, 411 U.S. at 530. 
102 Georgia, 411 U.S. at 531 (“The State of Georgia claims that § 5 is inapplicable to the 1972 House plan, 
… because the Act does not reach ‘reapportionment’…”). 
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Section Five of the Voting Rights Act.103  The Court held that reapportionment plans 
were cognizable under Section Five of the Act and restated its 1966 holding in 
Katzenbach that the law is a permissible exercise of Congressional authority under the 
Fifteenth Amendment.104  Not only did the Court reaffirm the constitutionality of the law, 
the majority made it stronger by expanding the subject matter covered by Section Five 
and allowing the Attorney General to block proposed changes without an affirmative 
finding of a discriminatory purpose or effect.105 
 The Court once again ruled in favor of the Voting Rights Act seven years later in 
City of Rome v. United States.  A political subdivision, the city of Rome in Georgia, 
submitted its proposed, amended voting law to the Attorney General for approval.106  The 
federal government rejected the proposed changes as discriminatory, and the city brought 
suit, claiming Section Five to be an unconstitutional intrusion by the federal government 
on states’ rights as applied to their proposed changes.107  In discussing the 1975 extension 
of the Act, the Court reaffirmed its constitutionality.108  When applied to the changes 
sought by Rome, Georgia, the Court found that the Attorney General was within his 
rights to deny the proposed changes.109 
                                                        
103 Id. (“The State also challenges … Attorney General's conduct of the § 5 objection procedure, claiming 
… that the Attorney General cannot object to a state plan without finding that it in fact has a discriminatory 
purpose or effect…”). 
104 Id. at 526. 
105 Id. 
106 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 161 (1980), abrogated by Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612. 
107 Id. at 162. 
108 Id. at 182 (“The extension of the Act, then, was plainly a constitutional method of enforcing the 
Fifteenth Amendment.”). 
109 Id at 183 (“We conclude that the District Court did not clearly err in finding that the city had failed to 
prove that the 1966 electoral changes would not dilute the effectiveness of the Negro vote in Rome.”). 
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 In 1999, the Court reaffirmed that holding in Lopez v. Monterey County. 110  
California, a state not covered by the Voting Rights Act, “passed legislation altering the 
scheme for electing judges in Monterey County, California[,] . . .  a “covered” 
jurisdiction required to preclear its voting changes.”111  California argued that since the 
state as a whole is not subject to the Voting Rights Act, the state need not submit changes 
they plan to implement to their voting procedures for review, even if the changes apply to 
political subdivisions within California that are covered under Section Four.112   The 
Court, however, was not persuaded by the argument and held that, even though Monterey 
County had no part in the enactment of the law, as a covered jurisdiction under Section 
Four, the jurisdiction would still need to seek pre-clearance for that state-mandated 
change because it would apply to judges in the county.113 
 The history of litigation concerning the Voting Rights Act shows that not only is 
the law constitutional, but also the Court has deemed it proper to strengthen and expand 
the law through common law doctrine.  A look at the common law history demonstrates 
that the majority’s conclusion—that the law is an unwarranted intrusion into the realm of 
states’ rights—is unfounded.   
C. Federal Involvement in State Elections Outside the Voting Rights Act 
Even before the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, the Court upheld federal 
involvement in state election law through the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
                                                        
110 Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266 (1999), abrogated by Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612. 
111 Id. at 269. 
112 Id. at 278 (“The State urges, in response, that § 5 expressly limits its pre-clearance requirements to 
covered jurisdictions. ‘Partially covered’ jurisdictions like California, the State insists, are under no 
obligation to comply with § 5.”). 
113 Id. (“Because we agree with appellants that a covered jurisdiction ‘seeks to administer’ a voting change 
even where the jurisdiction exercises no discretion in giving effect to a state-mandated change, we 
conclude that the Cnty. is required to seek pre-clearance before implementing California laws that effect 
voting changes in the Cnty..”). 
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Amendment.114  In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, the Court held that, under 
the Equal Protection Clause, a state could not institute a poll tax as a prerequisite to 
voting.115   Citing equal protection concerns with the state voting policies, the Court 
concluded: 
[T]hat a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the 
voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter 
qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not 
paying this or any other tax. Our cases demonstrate that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains the 
States from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously 
discriminate.116 
 
 Another example of the Supreme Court, and by extension the federal government, 
inserting itself into fights involving state voting procedures outside the purview of the 
Voting Rights Act is Reynolds v. Sims.117  The court held that the apportionment of 
legislative districts, based on the 1900 census (the case was decided in 1964), was out of 
date and not reflective of the population.118  The challengers to the system argued that the 
district in question had grown enough in population to be split into two legislative 
districts, a move that would undo black vote dilution that had occurred by allowing the 
voting bloc to be placed within a uniquely large, majority-white legislative district.119  
The Court held that the state must redraw the districts and “make an honest and good 
faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal 
population as is practicable.”120 
                                                        
114 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall … deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
115 Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
116 Id. at 666. 
117 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 577. 
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 Finally, in Baker v. Carr, voters in Tennessee claimed that the apportionment of 
the Tennessee General Assembly violated their equal protection rights because the 
districts were not approximately equal in terms of population.121  The Court held that 
Tennessee voters had standing to sue the state over the alleged discriminatory drawing of 
state legislative districts intended to dilute the black vote.122 
 As the aforementioned cases show, the Court has a long history of injecting itself 
in state-based voting procedures to ensure they square with the Constitution’s Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendment guarantees.  As such, this Comment questions why the 
majority in Shelby County would ignore the Constitution and stare decisis by holding that 
the federal government has little to no role to play in regulating state elections. 
D. The Tenth Amendment is Not a Shield to Federal Oversight of State Elections 
As a foundation for Justice Roberts’s belief that the federal government has no 
role to play in regulating state elections—in opposition to the civil war amendments and 
judicial precedent—the Justice points to the language of the Tenth Amendment.123  But 
Justice Roberts’s understanding of the Tenth Amendment is misguided here.  The Tenth 
Amendment requires the federal government to refrain from compelling the states to 
enact regulation and legislation pursuant to a federal goal. It does not, however, prohibit 
however the federal government from requiring the states to conduct themselves in a 
certain way in order to comply with federal requirements.124  This distinction can be 
found in two relatively recent Court cases—South Carolina v. Baker and Reno v. 
Condon.  South Carolina v. Baker held “[t]hat a State wishing to engage in certain 
                                                        
121 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
122 Id. 
123 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461–462 (1991) (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124–
125 (1970)). 
124 See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
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activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal 
standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents no [Tenth Amendment] 
constitutional defect.”125 
The Court affirmed this distinction twelve years later in Reno v. Condon, when 
the Court held: 
Like the statute at issue in Baker, the DPPA [federal law challenged under 
the Tenth Amendment in this case] does not require the States in their 
sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens [in a way mandated by 
the federal government by enacting laws]. The DPPA regulates the States 
as the owners of databases. It does not require the South Carolina 
Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state 
officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private 
individuals.126 
 
These cases create a distinction regarding the applicability of the Tenth 
Amendment.  Tenth Amendment concerns only manifest when the federal government 
forces the states to enact laws in conjunction with a federal program.127  If a federal 
program only seeks compliance from states with certain regulations without forcing states 
to enact specific legislation, there are no Tenth Amendment issues.128  The Voting Rights 
Act does not force states to enact specific voting procedures, it only denies changes it 
deems discriminatory and not in compliance with the regulations created by the Act.129  
Covered jurisdictions are still free to enact any voting procedures they deem appropriate, 
so long as they are not discriminatory. 
VI. Present Circumstances Regarding Voting Rights 
 
A. Voter Registration Numbers are Misleading  
 
                                                        
125 Baker, 485 U.S. at 514–515. 
126 Reno, 528 U.S. at 151. 
127 Id. 
128 Baker, 485 U.S. at 1362. 
129 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2013). 
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Justice Roberts, along with the majority in this case, proclaim the Voting Rights 
Act is no longer necessary because the vestiges of discrimination that were rampant 
during the civil rights period no longer exist today.130  Justice Roberts interprets the 
parity in voting numbers today in the covered jurisdictions as a sufficient basis for his 
conclusion.131  This conclusion is an overly simplistic view.  Even looking strictly at the 
numbers in 1965 compared to today, one can conclude that racism, bigotry, and prejudice 
are still major problems in the twenty-first century United States.  As one study points 
out: 
Nationwide, African-American voter turnout was approximately 15 
percentage points below that of the non-Hispanic white population in 
2006, and 12 points below white turnout in 2010. In 2008 and 2012, 
however, black turnout was within 5 percentage points of white turnout.132 
 
A shallow look at these numbers tends to support the majority’s conclusion that the 
Voting Rights Act has solved the problem of states withholding the right to vote from 
minorities and, as such, is no longer necessary.   
A deeper analysis suggests otherwise.  Rather than looking at the states as a 
whole, the study looked deeper into political subdivisions within each state.  The study 
found that the parity in state-wide turnout numbers only exists because the Voting Rights 
Act called for redistricting in some states that gave blacks who lived in a concentrated 
area their own legislative district.133  This redistricting gave them perceived voting power 
and brought them to the polls, thus boosting their voter turnout numbers.134  In pre-
                                                        
130 Shelby Cnty., supra note 27. 
131 Id. 
132 The SCOTUS Majority Is Missing Exactly What the VRA Sought to Remedy, 
http://themonkeycage.org/2013/06/27/the-scotus-majority-is-missing-exactly-what-the-vra-sought-to-
remedy/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
133 Id. 
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clearance states that do not have significantly large African American legislative districts, 
however, the gap between black and white voter turnout is huge.135  
Further, Justice Roberts fails to realize that the parity in registration numbers 
proves that the Voting Rights Act continues to work exactly as it is intended.  By taking 
away the Act, the majority has taken away the government’s most powerful weapon in 
ensuring equal access to the polls.  Given current Department of Justice numbers, such a 
weapon is still needed.136  Since the Act’s passage, states have tried to implement voting 
laws that would have the effect of limiting the minority vote.  Thankfully, the Voting 
Rights Act gave the federal government the power to stop those laws before they were 
ever implemented.  Now that the Act has been gutted, there is every reason to believe 
these formerly rejected laws will be implemented.  As a result, the parity in voter 
registration numbers will disappear.  
B. Second-Generation Barriers Continue to Exist  
Once the analysis moves beyond hard numbers to comparing the percentage of 
whites who voted with the percentage of blacks, it becomes clearer that the Voting Rights 
Act remains a necessity in ensuring fairness in our democracy, specifically to stop more 
subtle, second-generation barriers that dilute the power of the minority vote.  Consider 
the language of the 2006 reauthorization.137  Second-generation barriers to voting do not 
physically keep minorities out of voting booths like literacy tests and poll taxes used to 
                                                        
135 Id.  
136 1 Voting Rights Act: Evidence of Continued Need, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, infra note 146; H.R. REP. NO. 109-478,  infra note 
148. 
137 Voting Rights Act Reauthorization, supra note 6 (“[V]estiges of discrimination in voting continue to 
exist as demonstrated by second generation barriers constructed to prevent minority voters from fully 
participating in the electoral process.”) (emphasis added). 
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do, but they have the same deleterious effect of silencing people of color in our 
democratic system.138  According to Justice Ginsburg: 
Second-generation barriers come in various forms. One of the 
blockages is racial gerrymandering, the redrawing of legislative 
districts in an “effort to segregate the races for purposes of 
voting.”139 Another is adoption of a system of at-large voting in 
lieu of district-by-district voting in a city with a sizable black 
minority. By switching to at-large voting, the overall majority 
could control the election of each city council member, effectively 
eliminating the potency of the minority’s votes.140 A similar effect 
could be achieved if the city engaged in discriminatory annexation 
by incorporating majority-white areas into city limits, thereby 
decreasing the effect of VRA-occasioned increases in black voting. 
Whatever the device employed, this Court has long recognized that 
vote dilution, when adopted with a discriminatory purpose, cuts 
down the right to vote as certainly as denial of access to the 
ballot.141 
 
Congress considered evidence that these second-generation barriers continue to exist, 142 
and thus overwhelmingly concluded that a Voting Rights Act is still necessary.143  Justice 
Roberts and the rest of the majority rejected these extensive findings and nullified a law 
that Congress, in an unusually bipartisan manner, concluded was still relevant and 
necessary today.144  
C. The Voting Rights Act is Working and Present Examples Dictate a Need for 
Continued Federal Involvement in the Oversight of Elections 
 
                                                        
138 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2634 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Efforts to reduce the 
impact of minority votes, in contrast to direct attempts to block access to the ballot, are aptly described as 
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1965 protections, racial and language minority citizens will be deprived of the opportunity to exercise their 
right to vote, or will have their votes diluted, undermining the significant gains made by minorities in the 
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Present day circumstances dictate a need for federal oversight in elections, 
specifically in the South. Section Two statistics support this conclusion.  As Justice 
Ginsburg points out, “[a]lthough covered jurisdictions account for less than 25% of the 
nation’s population . . . they accounted for 56% of successful Section 2 litigation since 
1982. . . .  Controlling for population, there were nearly four times as many successful §2 
cases in covered jurisdictions as there were in non-covered jurisdictions.”145  The covered 
jurisdictions in the South continue to try and restrict minority voter access, whether 
physically or through vote dilution.  Federal oversight of state voting laws, including the 
Voting Rights Act, continues to serve a relevant purpose.  These statistics demonstrate a 
need to strengthen the Voting Rights Act, not restrict it. 
Along with Section Two, the volume of Section Five objections show that we 
have not come all that far since 1965.  In actuality, there were more Department of 
Justice objections to proposed changes in voting procedures between 1982 and 2004 
(626) than there were between 1965 and 1982 (490).146  Justice Ginsburg cites several 
examples of such proposed changes in her dissent.147  In addition, since 1982, over 800 
proposed changes to voting procedures in covered jurisdictions were either altered or 
withdrawn before the Department of Justice had a chance to rule on them.148 
Statutory analysis does not fully explain why the federal government has a 
continued role in overseeing state election procedures.  Previous case law in Alabama, 
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the home of Shelby County, demonstrated the continued need for federal oversight as a 
protection of minority voting rights.149 
In Pleasant Grove v. United States, the Court held that Pleasant Grove attempted 
to dilute the voting power of a bloc of minority voters by annexing all-white areas into 
the city while refusing annexation requests of largely black areas150 to provide for the 
growth of a “monolithic white voting bloc.”151 
In Hunter v. Underwood, the Court “struck down an Alabama Constitutional 
provision that prohibited anyone convicted of a misdemeanor offense involving moral 
turpitude from voting.” 152   The Court unanimously concluded the clause’s “original 
enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate blacks on account of race.”153 
In Dillard v. Crenshaw City the Court found that the at-large election system in 
many counties in Alabama has “consistently erected barriers to keep black persons from 
full and equal participation in the social, economic, and political life of the state.”154 
Finally, in United States v. McGregor, the Court found that recorded 
conversations between Alabama state legislators revealed shocking results.  One state 
lawmaker referred to blacks as “Aborigines.”  Another state lawmaker explained that he 
wanted to keep a gambling initiative off the ballot so as to decrease African American 
voter turnout.155 
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While Justice Roberts may believe that institutionalized racism in the form of 
unfair statewide voting laws no longer exists,156 the facts paint a starkly different picture.  
This is the picture Congress saw in 2006 when it overwhelmingly reauthorized the Act,157 
and the picture the majority willfully ignored in coming to its holding.  
D. Since the Heart of the Voting Rights Act was Struck Down, States Have 
Already Begun to Implement Laws that Would Have Been Blocked Under 
Section Five 
 
Once the Court’s opinion was handed down, several states formerly covered 
under Section Five have started implementing laws that will weaken the minority vote.  
Texas is one of those states.  For example, Texas had previously tried to implement a 
voter identification (“ID”) law in the state, but the law was blocked under Section Five.158  
When Shelby County came down, Texas was freed from Section Five’s requirements and, 
therefore, the state had the unhindered power to implement any changes into its voting 
laws it deemed appropriate.  As such, it passed the previously blocked voter ID law.  
Now, in order to vote in Texas, one must present a Texas driver license issued by the 
Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS), Texas Election Identification Certificate 
issued by DPS, Texas personal identification card issued by DPS, Texas concealed 
handgun license issued by DPS, United States military identification card containing the 
person’s photograph, United States citizenship certificate containing the person’s 
photograph, or a United States passport.159 
Texas argues such a law is necessary to prevent voter fraud. The facts, however, 
say otherwise: “[o]ver the past decade, Texas has convicted 51 people of voter fraud. . . .  
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Only four of those cases were for voter impersonation, the only type of voter fraud that 
voter ID laws prevent.”160  Given all of the objective facts—the federal government 
previously blocked the law as discriminatory, it is harder for people of color to get proper 
photo identification than white people, and voter fraud is a statistically insignificant 
problem in the state—one begins to wonder whether this law is really in effect to weaken 
the minority vote in Texas. 
Texas is not the only state to quickly change its laws following the Shelby County 
decision. Alabama, another previously-covered jurisdiction and one with a recent history 
of discrimination,161 followed suit by requiring voters to present a valid ID before they 
can vote.162  This law “place[s] its largest burden on black voters who lack acceptable 
forms of identification and don’t have immediate access to alternatives.” 163   As an 
additional burden, the law forces citizens to get a brand new ID card whenever they move 
within the state.164  Once again, this provision burdens poor, minority voters more than 
any other group.165  
North Carolina also quickly amended its voting laws following Shelby County as 
well. The North Carolina law makes several changes.  First, “[t]he bill requires voters to 
show government-issued ID, shortens early voting [from seventeen days to ten days] and 
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ends early pre-registration for teens, among other changes.”166  In addition, the bill stops 
same day registration and forces voters to either register or make needed changes to their 
registration at least twenty-five days before the election.  Further, a state-wide high 
school program that registers students in advance of their eighteenth birthday will be 
eliminated.167  Next, the law prohibits straight-ticket voting, which has been in place 
since 1925.168  Straight-ticket voting allows voters to vote for all candidates from the 
same party with one punch or mark on the ballot.169  While neutral on their fact, these 
laws are aimed at preventing uneducated, poor, minority citizens from exercising the 
right to vote. 
Mississippi also was quick to change its voting law post-Shelby County.  Under 
the new law, the newly non-covered jurisdiction requires all citizens to show an 
acceptable form of ID to vote.  Acceptable forms of ID include: a Mississippi driver’s 
license; a photo ID card issued by a branch, department, or agency of Mississippi’s 
government; a U.S. passport; a U.S. or Mississippi state or local government employee 
photo ID; a Mississippi firearm license; a student photo ID issued by a Mississippi 
college, university, or community college; a U.S. military ID; or, a tribal photo ID.170 
One common fact among all these states with a history of institutionalized 
discrimination is the presence of a voter ID law, a law that studies and statistics show 
adversely affects people of color more than white people.  Although these states claim 
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that voter ID laws are necessary to prevent voter fraud, this Comment argues that this 
motive is illusory given that voter fraud is an insignificant problem in this county.171  
Moreover, the implementation of these laws so quickly after the Shelby County decision 
suggests that the laws’ passage was at least partially motivated by racial animus. 
Many critics say requiring a voter ID is discriminatory, because statistics show 
that people of color, on average, do not have proper government identification in the 
same numbers that white people do.172  According to one 2012 report from the Brennan 
Center for Social Justice, “[n]early 500,000 eligible voters do not have access to a vehicle 
and live more than 10 miles from the nearest state ID-issuing office open more than two 
days a week.  Many of them live in rural areas with dwindling public transportation 
options.”173  Additionally, “[m]ore than 10 million eligible voters live more than 10 miles 
from their nearest state ID-issuing office open more than two days a week.”174  The study 
also finds the voter ID laws are most harmful to people of color specifically:  
1.2 million eligible black voters and 500,000 eligible Hispanic 
voters live more than 10 miles from their nearest ID-issuing office 
open more than two days a week. People of color are more likely 
to be disenfranchised by these laws since they are less likely to 
have photo ID than the general population.175… These voters may 
be particularly affected by the significant costs of the 
documentation required to obtain a photo ID. Birth certificates can 
cost between $8 and $25. Marriage licenses, required for married 
women whose birth certificates include a maiden name, can cost 
between $8 and $20. By comparison, the notorious poll tax — 
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outlawed during the civil rights era — cost $10.64 in current 
dollars.176 … The result is plain: Voter ID laws will make it harder 
for hundreds of thousands of poor Americans to vote. They place a 
serious burden on a core constitutional right that should be 
universally available to every American citizen.177 
  
The above statistics demonstrate that voter ID laws significantly affect minority 
voters more so than white voters.  That in and of itself should be reason enough to strike 
laws of this nature.  Another reason to strike these types of laws, however, is that the 
problem these laws are designed to prevent—voter fraud—is virtually non-existent.  In 
addition to the voter fraud discussed in Texas above,178 a nation-wide study conducted by 
the Carnegie-Knight New21 Program has found that “voter fraud at the polls is an 
insignificant aspect of American elections. . . .  There is absolutely no evidence that 
[voter impersonation fraud] has affected the outcome of any election in the United States, 
at least any recent election in the United States.” 179   For the study, News21 “sent 
thousands of requests to election officers in all 50 states, asking for every case of 
fraudulent activity including registration fraud, absentee ballot fraud, vote buying, false 
election counts, campaign fraud, casting an ineligible vote, voting twice, voter 
impersonation fraud and intimidation.”180  The study found only ten cases of in person 
voter impersonation, which is the type of voter fraud the voter ID laws are designed to 
prevent.181  There have been 146 million registered voters in the United States since 
2000, so the ten confirmed cases of in-person voter fraud “represent one out of every 15 
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million prospective voters.”182  It is curious that several states, states recently covered 
under Section Four of the Voting Rights Act, have begun implementing laws that place 
an inordinate burden on minorities and their right to vote, especially when the “problem” 
these laws are designed to prevent is basically non-existent. 
Even prestigious judges who had previously held that voter ID laws are a valid 
exercise of state sovereignty have reversed course.  Federal Appellate Judge, and well-
respected legal scholar, Richard Posner held in 2007 that voter ID laws were 
constitutional.183  He now claims, however, that he made a mistake: “I plead guilty to 
having written the majority opinion [in Crawford v. Marian County Election Board, a 
case that upheld Indian’s voter ID requirement]. … [That law is] a type of law now 
widely regarded as a means of voter suppression rather than of fraud prevention.”184  
Posner went on to state that had the lawyers arguing against the voter ID law in Marion 
County done a better job of presenting the undeniable fact that voter ID laws are just a 
subtler form of voter suppression, he would have held the voter ID law invalid: “We 
judges and lawyers, we don’t know enough about the subject matters we regulate, right?  
And if the lawyers would have provided us with a lot of information about the abuse of 
voter identification laws, this case would have been decided differently.”185  With more 
states passing these restrictive laws, many judges and legal scholars realizing that the true 
goal of the legislation is not to prevent non-existent voter fraud, but to suppress the 
minority vote.   
VII. A Twenty-First Century Voting Rights Act 
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As previously mentioned, the majority does not feel the decision is that significant 
because it left in place Section Two as a remedy to combat instances of discriminatory 
voting laws.186  But Section Two is an insufficient remedy, on its own, to stop states from 
instituting voting procedures that will disproportionately affect minority voters.187  As 
noted above, states formerly covered have already begun to institute laws that will undo 
all of the progress made under the Voting Rights Act.188  As such, Congress needs to pass 
a new pre-clearance formula.  The new pre-clearance formula should give the 
Department of Justice as much power as it had previously to block discriminatory voter 
laws before they go into effect.  While registration numbers are important (they were a 
main part of the pre-clearance formula before), the formula should also cover areas where 
intentional vote dilution has occurred through the redrawing of district lines and the 
proliferation of at large voting systems.  Such protective coverage can be identified using 
statistics: if a large number of minority voters occupy a political subdivision, yet no 
minority is ever elected to represent them over a period of many years, this should be 
evidence of vote dilution.  
Finally, the new pre-clearance formula should include a bail out provision for 
states that have demonstrated a long adherence to equality in voting.  The bailout was 
working before; “[n]early 200 jurisdictions have successfully bailed out of the pre-
clearance requirement, and the DOJ has consented to every bailout application filed by an 
eligible jurisdiction since the current bailout procedure became effective in 1984.”189  
The bailout provision should stay as it was: a jurisdiction can bail out if it demonstrated it 
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has not instituted or attempted to institute any discriminatory voting procedures for ten 
years.190 
VIII. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court’s decision to strike the Section Four pre-clearance formula of 
the Voting Rights Act is not only a disturbing judicial intervention against the will of the 
people, it also carries with it wide-ranging effects that will undoubtedly undo much of the 
social progress made in the last fifty years.  The reasons the majority in Shelby County 
gave for the decision are inadequate and, upon closer examination, do not tell the whole 
story.  It is up to Congress to act swiftly and restore one of the most important laws in 
American legislative history. 
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